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 Executive Summary 
The Department of Defense (DoD) has placed a growing emphasis on the pursuit of agile 
capabilities via net-centric operations. The breadth of technological advancements in 
communication and sensing has generated exciting opportunities for battlefield systems to exploit 
collaboration to multiple effects. In this setting, systems able to interoperate along several 
dimensions increase the efficiency of the overall system-of-systems (SoS) manifold. However, the 
manner in which these system-of-systems are acquired (designed, developed, tested and fielded) 
hasn’t completely kept pace with the shift in operational doctrine. In our current project, we have 
attempted to unravel the layers of complexities in an SoS acquisition program, outline an 
acquisition strategy better suited for such programs and develop an exploratory analysis tool to 
provide insights into the acquisition process.  
The research efforts during the report period have focused on the development of two types of 
tools to investigate the impact of development dependencies on the successful acquisition of SoS: 
1) a computational exploratory model and 2) an analytical approach.  
The conceptual model for acquisition strategy proposed in our project is based on the 16 
technical management and technical system-engineering processes outlines in the Defense 
Acquisition Guidebook  (DAG), often referred to as the 5000-series guide. Our conceptual model 
for acquisition is centered on the revised processes of the 2007 System-of-Systems System 
Engineering (SoS-SE). Simulation of the development process, however, is not always feasible 
due to the large amount of information required to perform a simulation. The analytical approach 
seeks to augment the computational approach by developing a method that enables the comparison 
of networks of systems that are connected to each by developmental interdependencies by 
exposing and quantifying the cascading effects of development risk. The goal is to allow 
acquisition professionals to develop intuition for procuring and deploying system-of-systems.   
Applications of the modeling tool and the analytical network analysis method to different SoS 
topologies enables the comparison of the developmental performance of differing SoS and 
provides the ability for acquisition professionals to identify the features of a SoS that contribute 
most to the success or delays in the development process. 
The work summarized in this report builds on the progress made during the previous year’s 
work by improving upon and experimenting with the exploratory model to address 
systems-specific risk, its propagation to interdependent systems, and the comparison of SoS 
alternatives; this last item is possible by both the exploratory model as well as the analytical 
network analysis method also developed during this period.  Example studies presented in this 
report have quantified the importance and impact of system-specific characteristics (e.g. 
development risk, development pace, interdependency strength, etc.) as well as their cascading 
effects for the entire SoS. The example studies present the potential of these tools to aid acquisition 
professionals to develop an intuition of the development of complex SoS and methods that enable 
the analysis of alternatives for SoS in the context of the development and acquisition process. 
 
Outreach & Collaboration: Our work during the project period has resulted in five external 
publications/presentations at a diverse set of venues.  
First and foremost was our paper and presentation at the 7th Annual NPS Acquisition 
Research Symposium in Monterey, CA in April 2010. This event continues to be a valuable venue 
for obtaining both critique of our work from fellow academics but also recommendations and 
interest from the practitioner community. Such broad-based feedback is unique to the Symposium. 
The citation for this paper is: Mane, M., DeLaurentis, D.A., "System Development and Risk 
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Propagation in Systems of Systems," 7th Naval Postgraduate School Symposium, Monterey, CA, 
11-13 May 2010. 
Second, an invited presentation on this work was made at the 2nd Annual Review of 
Research for the Systems Engineering Research Center (SERC). The SERC, funded by the 
DDR&E and NRO primarily, was interested in hearing new ideas in systems engineering research 
that was funded elsewhere but that could be leveraged in new ways for SERC specific research 
objectives.  
Third, a paper that focused on the analytical portion of the work (described later in this 
report) was prepared and presented. The citation for this paper is: Mane, M., DeLaurentis, D.A., 
"Network-Level Metric Measuring Delay Propagation in Networks of Interdependent Systems," 
5th IEEE International Conference on System of Systems Engineering, Laughborough, UK, 22-24 
June 2010. The exposure to researches in system of systems modeling was a valuable experience 
for us; several suggestions have been incorporated to improve the approach.  
Fourth, a paper was presented at an international aerospace engineering conference to 
broaden the exposure of the application problems that have served as our examples for 
demonstrating the methods we develop. The citation for this work is: Mane, M., DeLaurentis, D.A., 
"System Integration and Risk Propagation in Aeronautical Systems-of-Systems," The 27th 
Congress of International Council of the Aeronautical Sciences (ICAS), Nice, France, 19-24 Sept. 
2010.  
Finally, a journal article stemming from the analytical work was submitted to a special 
issue on complexity of the ASME Journal of Mechanical Design. 
 
Introduction 
The purpose of capabilities-based acquisition, as described by Charles and Turner (2004), is to 
acquire a set of capabilities instead of acquiring a family of threat-based, service-specific systems.  
The Missile Defense Agency (MDA), for example, uses capability-based acquisition to evaluate 
the success of a program based on its ability to provide a new capability for a given cost, and not on 
its ability to meet specific performance requirements (Spacy, 2004).  The Joint Mission Capability 
Package (JMCP) concept is another example that aims to create a joint interdependency between 
systems to combine capabilities in order to maximize reinforcing effects and minimize 
vulnerabilities (Durkac, 2005).  The goal is a more efficient utilization of both human and 
machine-based assets and, in turn, improved combat power.   
To accomplish the desired capability, systems are increasingly required to interoperate along 
several dimensions which characterizes them as systems-of-systems (SoS) (Maier, 1998).  
Systems-of-systems most often consist of multiple, heterogeneous, distributed systems that can 
(and do) operate independently but can also collaborate in networks to achieve a goal. Examples of  
systems-of-systems include: civil air transportation (DeLaurentis et al., 2008), battlefield ISR 
(Butler, 2001), missile defense (Francis, 2007), etc.  According to Maier (1998), the distinctive 
traits of operational and managerial independence are the keys to making the collaboration work.  
The network structure behind the collaboration, however, can contribute both negatively and 
positively to the successful achievement of SoS capabilities and, even earlier, to the developmental 
success.  Collaboration via interdependence may increase capability potentials, but it also contains 
concealed risk in the development and acquisition phases.  Brown and Flowe (2005), for instance, 
have investigated the implications of the development of SoS to understand the drivers that 
influence cost, schedule, and performance of SoS efforts.  Results of their study indicate that the 
major drivers – as indicated by subject-matter-experts – include systems standards and 
requirements, funding, knowledge, skills and ability, system interdependencies, conflict 
management, information access, and environmental demands.   
Disruptions in the development of one system can have unforeseen consequences on the 
development of others if the network dependencies are not accounted.  The goal of a single 
system’s program manager is the mitigation of risk leading to successful development of that 
specific system.  While direct or immediate consequences of decisions are nearly always 
considered, the cascading second-and-third order effects that result from the complex 
interdependencies between constituent systems in a SoS are often not, which make success all the 
more difficult.  It falls on acquisition managers and systems engineers (or systems-of-systems 
engineers) to understand and manage the successful development of a system, or family of systems, 
to produce the targeted capability in this challenging setting.  
Evidence is abundant that system-of-systems oriented endeavors have struggled to succeed 
amidst the development complexity.  The Future Combat System is a latest example (Gilmore, 
2008).  Civil programs have not been spared either, e.g. Constellation Program (Committee on 
Systems Integration for Project Constellation, 2004) and NextGen (NextGen Integration and 
Implementation Office, 2009).  Rouse (2001) summarizes the complexity of a system (or model of 
a system) as related to the intentions with which one addresses the systems, the characteristics of 
the representation that appropriately accounts for the system’s boundaries, architecture, 
interconnections and information flows, and the multiple representations of a system. 
The work summarized here specifically targets complexities stemming from system 
development risk, the interdependencies among systems, and the span-of-control of the systems or 
system-of-systems managers and engineers.  The objective of the research is to quantify the impact 
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of system-specific risk and system interdependency complexities using a) our evolving  
computational exploratory modeling approach and, b) a new analytical approach for quantifying 
the same effects.  The work comprises new improvements to a computational exploratory model 
(CEM) – a discrete event simulation model – previously introduced in prior Acquisition Symposia 
(Mane and DeLaurentis, 2009 and 2010) that aims to provide decision makers with insights into 
the development process by propagating development risk in the SoS network and capturing the 
impact that system risk, system interdependencies, and system characteristics have on the timely 
completion of a program. We also introduce complementary work related to an analytical 
approach to treat the same complexities via computations on conditional probabilities that relate 
the transmission of risk in network dependent systems.  
 
Computational Exploratory Model (CEM) Overview 
The CEM is based on the 16 basic technical management and technical system-engineering 
processes outlined in the Defense Acquisition Guidebook (U.S. Department of Defense, 2008a), 
often referred to as the 5000-series guide. However, an SoS environment changes the way these 
processes are applied. The Systems Engineering Guide for System-of-Systems (SoS-SE) (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2008b) addresses these considerations by modifying some of the 16 
processes in accord with an SoS environment.  The resulting processes and respective functions 
consist of translating inputs from relevant stakeholders into technical requirements, developing 
relationships between requirements, designing and building solutions to address requirements, 
integrating systems into a high-level system element, and performing various managing and 
control activities to ensure that requirements are effectively met, risks are mitigated, and 
capabilities achieved. 
The CEM, centered on these revised processes, is a discrete event simulation of the 
development and acquisition process.  This process creates a hierarchy of analysis levels:  SoS 
Level (L1), Requirement Level (L2), and System Level (L3).  Component elements at each level 
are a network representation of the level below.  The SoS Level (L1) is comprised of the numerous, 
possibly interdependent, requirements (L2) needed to achieve a desired capability.  Similarly, 
satisfaction of each requirement in the Requirement Level (L2) requires a number of possibly 
interdependent systems (L3).   Figure 1 presents the description of the process modeled by the 
CEM. 
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Figure 1. Conceptual model of Acquisition Strategy based on SoSE Process (described in U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2008b) 
At the Requirement Level (L2), Requirements Development contains the technical 
requirements of the SoS (provided externally). The technical requirements are then examined in 
Logical Analysis to check for interdependencies amongst the requirements. A check for 
inconsistencies amongst requirements is also performed.  Design Solution development and 
Decision Analysis are the next processes, which belong to the System Level (L3). They produce 
the optimal design solution from the set of feasible solutions to meet the given requirements.  The 
optimal design solution is based not only on the current set of requirements and solution 
alternatives but also takes into account all previous information available through requirements, 
risk, configuration, interface and data management processes.  Because most acquisitions are 
multi-year projects involving many different parties, the overlap between the management 
processes, Design Solution and Decision Analysis processes, allows for greater tractability of 
decisions. It is at this stage that system interdependencies are identified.  The optimal design 
solution obtained from this phase is then sent to the next stage: Technology Planning and 
Technology Assessment. In the event that an optimal or sub-optimal design solution to successfully 
implement the given requirements does not exist, the feedback loop to Requirement Development 
translates into a change in the technical requirements for the SoS.  Technology Planning and 
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Technology Assessment are System Level (L3) scheduling processes that oversee the 
implementation, integration, verification and validation for all the component systems in the SoS.  
Systems in the SoS are often dependent on other systems for either implementation, integration, 
or both.  Disruptions during these stages of development in one of the systems result in time-lags in 
the acquisition process and to delays that propagate through the network of component systems 
impacting seemingly independent systems. For example, if the implementation of a system A is 
dependent on the Implementation of a system B – as could be the case for the development of an 
aircraft that depends on the specifications of a radar system – funding cuts to system B can result in 
development delays in system B but can also impact the development of system A.  If, on the other 
hand, a third system C depends on system A, this could also be affected by the problems caused in 
system C due to funding cuts.  
The Implementation and Integration Phases of component systems constitute the lowest level 
of detail modeled in the CEM.  The design decisions made at earlier stages must be implemented 
and integrated in these phases to generate the final product of a program.  Figure 2 presents an 
abstraction of the layered networks that result from the modeling of the acquisition process: 
systems are grouped to satisfy a requirement, and requirements are grouped to generate a 







Figure 2.  Layered network abstraction of Computational Exploratory Model 
Systems can be independent, can satisfy several requirements, and can depend on other 
systems.  The CEM simulates these layered relationships to capture the impacts that any changes – 
related to decision-making, policy, or development – in any of the component systems, 
requirements, and relationships between them have on the completion of a project.  The exercise of 
the CEM described in this paper specifically targets complexities stemming from system risk, the 
interdependencies among systems, and the span-of-control of the SoS authority (if present). The 
next section will present the model dynamics that make possible the study of these complexities 
and will explore the design space of the SoS authority and tradeoffs between development risk and 
the number of systems and system interdependencies in a SoS.   
 
Detailed Model Dynamics 
The CEM operates as a discrete event simulator of the development process.  Several 
challenges arise in developing a model for purposes of simulation and learning. Disruptions occur 
at various stages of development and are governed by the risk associated with the project or 
individual systems. The CEM models risk associated with the implementation and integration of 
each component system as well as the risk due to the system interdependencies.  Furthermore, 
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systems and SoS engineers are often faced with the decision of using legacy assets to satisfy a 
given requirement or opt for the development of brand new ones.  The CEM includes parameters 
such as readiness-level to differentiate between legacy assets/platforms, new systems, and 
partially implemented/integrated systems (i.e. systems under development) and to investigate the 
impact that the inclusion of such systems in the development of an SoS has on the success of a 
project.  The next sub-sections describe the model details:  parameters and inputs, Implementation 
and Integration dynamics, and the risk model. 
Model Input Parameters 
Table 1 presents the input parameters and the remainder of this section expands and explains 
their role in the CEM.    
Table 1. Input parameters of computational exploratory model 
Parameter Notation Description 
Requirement Level (L2) 
Requirement dependencies Dreq Adjacency matrix that indicates requirement interdependencies 
Risk profile Rreq Probability of disruptions in Requirement Development Phase  
Impact of disruptions Ireq Time penalty when disruptions hit Requirement Development Phase 
System Level (L3) 
System dependencies Dsys Adjacency matrix that indicates system interdependencies 
Development pace of design tdes Increase in completion of Design Solutions Phase  
Design risk profile Rdes Probability of disruptions in Design Solutions Phase 
Impact of design disruptions  Ides Time penalty when disruptions hit Design Solutions Phase 
Span-of-control soc Indicator of how Implementation and Integration are performed 
(sequentially or simultaneously) 
System initial readiness-level m0(i,r) Initial readiness-level of system i to satisfy requirement r (for 
Implementation Phase) 
System risk profile Rsys(i,r) Probability of disruptions (during implementation) of system i when 
satisfying requirement r 
Impact of disruptions Isys(i) Time penalty when disruptions hit system i during 
Implementation/Integration 
Implementation pace pimp(i) Increase in readiness-level at each time step during implementation of 
system i 
Integration pace pint(i) Increase in completeness-level at each time step during integration of 
system i 
Implementation start  limp(i,j) Readiness-level of system j when Implementation Phase of dependent 
system i begins  
Strength of dependency S(i,j) Strength of dependency of system i on system j 
 
The requirement dependency matrix (Dreq) indicates how the development and satisfaction of 
requirements depend on each other, which impacts the sequence in which requirements are 
developed and satisfied.  For example, if Requirement A depends on Requirement B, then 
development of Requirement A begins when Requirement B has been satisfied.  As requirements 
are developed, the risk profile (Rreq) of Requirement Development indicates the probability of 
disruptions at this stage in the development process. Disruptors signify a change in requirements or 
addition of new requirements. When a requirement is changed after the acquisition process has 
begun, it affects all subsequent processes and it causes a time delay (Ireq) that is added to the 
project time.  Every requirement that is implemented is fed into its own Design Solution and 
Decision Analysis (Figure 1) process. The Design Solution and Decision Analysis processes feed 
into each other and the risk profile (Rdes) indicates the probability of disruptions at each time–step 
during the completion of the stage with a value between 0 and 1.  Any disruptions at this stage 
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indicate that the design solution provided is not feasible and a time penalty (Ides) that indicates a 
re-design of the solution is incurred.  If the solution fails in multiple consecutive time-steps, then 
the requirement is sent back to Requirement Development stage, otherwise the set of component 
systems and their user-defined parameters are sent to the Technical Planning and Technical 
Assessment (Figure 1) processes based on the development-pace parameter of this stage. 
Implementation Phase Dynamics 
Technical Planning is the stage where Implementation and Integration of component systems 
is performed.  The Implementation Phase simulates the development of each system.  The nature 
of candidate systems may range from legacy systems to off-the-shelf, plug-and-play products to 
custom-built, new systems.  Development of a ‘brand new’ SoS has been and will remain a rare 
occurrence.  In their study on SoS, the United States Air Force (USAF) Scientific Advisory Board 
(Saunders, 2005) stated that one of the challenges in building an SoS is accounting for 
contributions and constraints of legacy assets.  Similarly, the regular utilization of off-the-shelf 
component systems in both defense and civil programs contribute to cost and time savings but also 
introduce a different type of risk to the system development process (Constantine, 2010).  These 
legacy systems may be used ‘as-is’ or may need re-engineering to fulfill needs of the new program.  
Here, we define legacy systems as systems that have been developed in the past to achieve a 
particular requirement, and new systems as not-yet-developed systems envisioned to satisfy a new 
requirement.   When considering the use of legacy systems to meet a new requirement, the 
capability of these systems to satisfy the new requirement is not necessarily the same as their 
capability to meet the original requirement for which they were designed.  Additionally, the risk 
associated with the modification of a legacy system and the risk associated with the development 
of a brand new system can be quite different.  Legacy systems may, however, provide cost and/or 
time benefits if modifications are less severe than a new development, as is the case with new 
systems.  To delineate systems in a meaningful way, we describe the spectrum of a system’s ability 
to satisfy a requirement in terms of its readiness-level.   
System readiness-level, a concept proposed by Sauser et al. (2006), is a metric that 
incorporates the maturity levels of critical components and their readiness for integration (i.e. 
integration requirements of technologies).  This is an extension of the widely used Technology 
Readiness Level (TRL), a metric that assesses the maturity level of a program’s technologies 
before system development begins (Department of Defense Directive 5000.2, 2005).  While 
similar in spirit to the SRL metric proposed by Sauser et al. (2006), readiness-level in the present 
work is defined in a different manner and with less detail.  We define system readiness level as the 
readiness-level of a system i to satisfy requirement r, m(i,r), with a value between 0 and 1.  A 
system with a readiness-level of 1 is a fully developed system that can provide a certain level of 
capability.  The dynamic model starts the Implementation Phase of a system from its initial 
readiness-level and simulates its development / implementation until it reaches a readiness-level of 
1.  An initial readiness-level of 0 indicates a brand new system that must be developed from 
scratch, while a system with an initial readiness-level greater than 0 indicates a legacy system that 
is partially developed to satisfy a requirement r, but needs further development to reach a 
readiness-level of 1.  In general, careful research of a candidate system i will determine its initial 
readiness-level to satisfy a requirement r, and, therefore, the amount of development necessary to 
achieve a readiness-level of 1.0.   
The CEM simulates the Implementation Phase as a series of time steps in which a 
pre-determined increment of readiness (pimp(i)) is gained at each time-step of each system i, or lost 
if a disruption occurs (according to the system risk profile of system i in satisfying requirement r, 
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Rsys(i,r)).  This is clearly a gross simplification of the actual development process for a system; 
however, it adequately serves the purposes of the research, which is focused on the 
interdependencies between systems to develop a SoS capability and aims to capture the impact of 
disruptions on the development process.  Accurate modeling of the Implementation Phase would 
increase the accuracy of the model for a particular application but it would not change the nature of 
the observed results.   
Representation of Risk 
The risk associated with the development of a system is a function of its inherent 
characteristics (technology, funding, and complexity levels) and on risk levels of the systems on 
which it depends.  The former may be estimated via a variety of analysis techniques that examine a 
system in detail, but the latter requires knowledge of system interdependencies which can be 
numerous, complicated, and often opaque.  Developmental interdependencies of SoS create 
layered networks that often span among a hierarchy of levels (DeLaurentis et al. 2005, Butler et al. 
2001, Ayyalasomayajula et al. 2008, Kotegawa et al. 2008).  The complexity of these networks 
often hides many of the otherwise explicit consequences of risk.  Depending on the network 
topology characteristics, disruptions to one of the critical nodes or links in the network can 
propagate through the network and result in degradation to seemingly distant nodes (Huang et al. 
2008).   
In this study we express risk as a density function that describes the probability of a disruption 
occurring at any time during the system development.  We concentrate on the Implementation and 
Integration Phase as the development stage where disruptions occur.  Here, inherent risk is the 
probability of disruptions due to the development characteristics of the subject system, e. g. 
technology readiness-level, funding, politics, etc.  Risk due to interdependencies, on the other 
hand, is the probability of disruptions during the Implementation Phase of a system due to 
disruption in the system on which the system of interest depends.  This is essentially the 
conditional probability of a disruption given that another system has a disruption.   
This study assumes that the inherent risk of a system i in satisfying requirement r, Rsys(i,r), is 
solely a function of its readiness-level, m(i,r).  While a somewhat simplified definition, expressing 
risk as a function of a system’s readiness-level is logical.  Recall that readiness-level is a metric 
that describes the necessary development of a system to satisfy a given requirement.  Therefore, 
risk changes as the readiness-level of a system increases.  The following equation introduces a 
relationship between a system’s readiness-level and risk (probability of disruption). 
    irimriR isys  ,1,   (1) 
In this relationship, αi (with a value between 0 and 1) is parameter that indicates the upper 
bound value of risk for system i (i.e. producing maximum probability of disruption) while βi is a 
shape parameter that indicates how quickly risk changes as a function of readiness-level.  This 
formulation implies that risk is highest at the early stages of development (e.g. low 
readiness-levels) and it decreases (at different rates depending on the value of the βi parameter) as 
development progresses.  For instance, when a system i has a readiness-level of 0.0 – it is a brand 
new system – the probability of disruptions during development will be highest, and it will have a 
value αi.  However, when the system has a readiness-level of 1.0, the probability of disruptions will 
be 0.  System inherent-risk is implemented in the CEM by using a uniform random distribution to 
select a value between 0 and 1 at each time-step of the Implementation or Integration Phase and 
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passing it into a binary channel to see if the number is smaller or greater than the probability of 
disruption defined by Rsys(i,j).  This determines if a disruption occurs or not. 
When all systems are independent, identification of the system with highest risk is trivial (e.g. 
system that, on average, will contribute more to delays in completion time).  However, when 
systems are interdependent, systems that otherwise have a low inherent risk can be greatly 
impacted by disturbances because of the transmission of risk from other systems.  Systems are 
impacted by nearest neighbors (those systems on which they directly depend; first-order 
dependencies) and by systems that impact those nearest neighbors (higher-order dependencies). 
The CEM models risk due to interdependencies in terms of the dependency strength between 
two given systems.  Dependency strength, S(i,j), is an input parameter that takes values between 0 
and 1 and is defined as the conditional probability (uniform random probability) that system i has a 
disruption given that system j (on which system i depends) has a disruption.  Risk due to 
interdependencies is, therefore, a function of the readiness-level of the dependent-upon system as 
well as the strength of that dependency.   A notional example of a simple SoS is utilized here to 












Figure 3. Layered network structure of example SoS  
Each system in this simple SoS network serves a role and provides a certain level of capability 
in order to satisfy some requirement.  The links between systems indicate interdependencies 
among systems.  The arrows indicate the directionality of dependence, including the case of 
mutual dependence.  Mane and DeLaurentis (2009) contains more detailed information on the 
CEM structure.  For this example, Figure 4 presents the implementation history of this 
three-system SoS with a risk profile that has αi, and βi, values of 0.2 and 4, respectively,  and two 
different levels of interdependency strength, S(i,j). 
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                              a)  S(i,j) = 0          b)  S(i,j) = 1 
Figure 4. Implementation Phase history for example problem  
Each system has a different initial readiness-level – system-A of 0.3, system-B of 0.5, and 
system-C of 0.  Recall that an initial readiness-level greater than zero indicates a legacy system 
that must be further developed to achieve a readiness level of 1 to satisfy a given requirement.  The 
model assumes that the readiness-level of a system can reduce to below initial readiness-level 
value.  This is reasonable since inherent disruptions or disruptions due to interdependencies can 
result in modifications to subsystems that were not previously considered (i.e. unforeseen 
technology limitations of a system may require redesign of a dependent system).   In Figure 4a, all 
systems are independent (dependency strength of zero).  The occasional set-backs in the 
readiness-level of each system are due to disruptions stemming from the inherent system risk.  In 
Figure 4b, one the other hand, dependency strength is highest (with a value of one).   Recall that 
dependency strength indicates the probability of disruption on the dependent system given that the 
system on which it depends has a disruption.  When the dependency strength is one, a disruption in 
a given system is always propagated to the dependent systems.  For example, disruptions in the 
development of system-C propagate to system-A with probability 1 and disruptions in the 
development of system-A propagate to system-B with probability 1.  Note, for instance, that there 
is a reduction in readiness-level in the development of the system-B every time that there is a 
reduction in readiness-level during the development of system-A or system-C (on which system-B 
depends).   The candidate systems for a desired capability can, in general, have different levels of 
dependency strengths.   
The number of Developmental Information Elements shared between constituent systems of 
an SoS may vary with each system pair.  In a given SoS, a value of dependency strength equal to 1 
will be assigned to the system pair that shares the maximum amount of Developmental 
Information Elements.  All other dependency strength values within the SoS will be relative to this 
maximum value. Table 2 presents dependency strength associations, notional descriptions and 
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Table 2. Strength of Dependency of system i on system j, S(i,j) when the maximum number 
of Developmental Information Elements shared within any two constituent systems 
of the SoS  is four. 
Value, 
S(i,j) Notional Definition 
1.00 
System i depends on system j for all 4 developmental information 
elements 
0.75 
System i depends on system j for 3 of the 4 developmental 
information elements 
0.50 
System i depends on system j for 2 of the 4 developmental 
information elements 
0.25 
System i depends on system j for 1 of the 4 developmental 
information elements 
0.00 System i is completely independent of system j 
 
Different dependency strengths and different inherent probability of disruption profiles may 
lead to different conclusions.  For instance, though inherent probability of disruption may be high, 
impacts on total completion time may be small if the dependency strength is low.  Figure 5 
presents a sensitivity of development time for this example problem on the value of dependency 
strength.    



































Figure 5. Impact of dependency strength on completion time for example problem 
As expected, higher dependency strength means higher development time.  In this example, 
the number of systems and interdependencies is invariable, and the increase in development time 
can be different for a different family of constituent systems.  When considering the development 
of different families of systems that can provide a desired capability, the characteristics of 
interdependencies between component systems can have a large impact on the decision to pursue 
development of a certain alternative.  Quantifying the impact that such characteristics have on the 
development process can aid decision makers in selecting the most promising alternative.   
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Impact of Risk and System Interdependencies 
Quantifying risk is a complicated function of the individual system characteristics as well as 
the interdependencies between systems.   The combinations of systems that can achieve a given 
capability-level can be numerous.  Depending on the selection of the constituent systems, the 
completion time of a project can vary greatly due to the number of constituent systems, their 
interdependencies, and risk profiles.  As these families of systems get larger, it becomes more 
difficult to quantify the impact that each system and system-characteristic has on the success of a 
project.  For instance, a three-system solution may appear to be preferable to a ten-system solution; 
but the interactions between the three systems can result in disruption propagation that greatly 
impacts the timely completion of the project.  System interdependencies and their characteristics 
can impact the completion time of a project by affecting the way in which disruption propagate.  In 
this section we demonstrate the impact that system-inherent risk and the strength of 
interdependencies between component systems can have on the timely completion of a project.  
Furthermore, we show and quantify how different families of systems that can provide the same 
set of capabilities can have greatly differing development histories. 
Interdependency Strength and Inherent Risk 
For this investigation we assume that in order to achieve some capability a family of three 
classes of systems has been identified; for instance, a class-A system can be a land-based radar or 
an airborne radar; a class-B system can be a large transport aircraft, a mid-size aircraft, or a small 
aircraft.  Each of these classes of systems provides a certain capability that is required to achieve a 
global capability of the SoS.   The design authority must decide which constituent system to select 
for each system-class.  A notional example of a simple SoS is utilized here (Figure 6).   
class-B system
class-A  system
class-C system  
Figure 6. Interdependencies of notional SoS 
The links between systems indicate interdependencies among systems.  For instance, 
development of a class-B system must rely on information about the development and capabilities 
of a class-A system in order to continue development.  Similarly, development of a class-A system 
needs information from a class-C system.  Different systems are available to designers or systems 
engineers for each system-class.  Each candidate system can have different risk characteristics as 
well as different interdependency characteristics.  If we assume that the systems engineer has 
identified these characteristics for each candidate system, we can use the CEM to simulate the 
development process when different combinations of these candidate systems are considered and 
identify the family of systems that results in the lowest expected completion time.   The strength of 
the CEM is in its ability to aggregate the individual system characteristics and quantify the 
SoS-level performance (with respect to development time) of a family of candidate systems.   
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Figure 7 presents results where the expected implementation time of a family of candidate 
systems is measured against the inherent risk of individual systems and their interdependency 
strengths.   
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       a)  System-specific risk profile      b)  Expected implementation time 
Figure 7. Impact of risk due to interdependencies on implementation time 
We assume here that all candidate systems will have the same risk profile and all 
interdependencies will have the same strength.  Figure 7a shows the inherent system risk, Rsys(i,r), 
as a function of system readiness-level, m(i,r), for five different risk profiles (five different αi 
values and a fixed βi parameter of 2).  The value of αi indicates the maximum inherent risk of a 
system according to Eqn. 1. The assumption here is that risk is highest in the earlier stages of 
development and it decreases as development progresses.   The results in Figure 7b present the 
expected implementation time when families of systems with different combinations of inherent 
risk profile and dependency strengths are considered.  Each point on the surface indicates a family 
of candidate systems with a given combination of maximum inherent risk and dependency 
strengths.  For instance, a solution that entails systems with a maximum inherent risk of zero and 
dependency strength of zero (e.g. independent systems with no development risk) will have an 
expected implementation time of 20 time units.  The three systems are developed simultaneously 
but have no impact on each other’s development.  The trends in Figure 7b show that the impact on 
implementation time of families of systems that have strong interdependencies is larger than when 
the systems have high inherent risk but low dependency strengths (e.g. the increase in 
implementation time is smaller as inherent risk increases than when the strength of dependencies 
increases).   
This investigation quantifies the impact that system interdependencies have on the 
implementation time of a project.  The results presented here point out the importance of 
interdependencies in the development process.  This type of analysis can prove useful to an SoS 
authority when selecting potential component systems as a part of a family of systems or SoS to 
satisfy a given requirement and achieve a desired capability.    
This simple example considers families of systems comprised of three constituent systems.  
Different candidate families of systems, however, can have differing number of constituent 
systems that can provide different system-capabilities to achieve the desired SoS capability.  
Similarly, risk profile and interdependency characteristics of the constituent systems can result in 
different disruption propagation and different development solutions. 
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Comparison of Alternatives  
Given a set of alternative means to satisfy a requirement, an SoS authority (in conjunction with 
systems engineers) must determine the best network of systems to develop and acquire.  The 
number of systems alone may not be a good indicator of the complexity of a system and the 
eventual developmental success.  The risk profile of systems as well as the number and strength of 
system interdependencies play an important role that often hamper understanding of the impact of 
decisions.  For instance, a SoS that is comprised of three constituent systems may appear more 
likely to succeed than a SoS comprised of five systems.  However, the number and strength of 
interdependencies between the five systems may be such that the expected completion time of this 
SoS is lower than the expected completion time of the three-system SoS.  The three-system 
example in the previous section showed that the strength of dependencies plays an important role 
in the timely completion of a SoS project.  Here we use the CEM to investigate the impact that 
network characteristics (number of systems, number of dependencies, and strength of 
dependencies) have on the completion time of a SoS project.  We compare the developmental time 











               a) Three-system alternative            b)  Five-system alternative 
Figure 8. Alternative families of systems 
The three-system network is the same network with three interdependencies as the one 
presented in Figure 6.  The new, five-system network is clearly a larger SoS with more systems 
and six interdependencies.  As in the previous section, different candidate systems are available to 
provide the required capability level.  The systems engineer would like to quantify the expected 
implementation time of each combination of systems for the three-system and the five-systems 
options.  Via a Monte Carlo simulation of 500 samples we are able to compute the expected 
implementation time of the five-system network – we previously did the same for the three-system 
network.  Figure 9 presents this result for the different combinations of inherent system risk and 
dependency strengths.   
























































































a) Three-system alternative    b)  Five-system alternative 
Figure 9. Expected implementation time of alternatives 
Figure 9a presents the expected implementation time of the three-system option (the same as 
Figure 7b) while Figure 9b presents the expected implementation time of the five-system network.   
As in the previous analysis, these results indicate the expected implementation time of candidate 
component systems that have differing levels of inherent risk and interdependency strengths.  The 
trends in the expected implementation time of the five-system option are larger than those of the 
three-system option.  This is expected because the former has more systems as well as more 
interdependencies.  Recall, however, that each point in these charts represents a candidate family 
of systems and one can see that the expected implementation times of some five-system 
alternatives are lower than some three-system alternatives.  To show this more clearly Figure 10 
presents the expected completion times when the inherent system risk of all candidate systems is 
highest (α = 0.2). 








































Figure 10. Expected implementation time of sample results 
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As previously mentioned, the implementation time of the five-system alternatives is always 
higher than the three-system alternatives.  However, if the dependency strength between the 
systems in the three-system alternative has a value of 1, the expected implementation time of this 
alternative will be 37 time units; if the dependency strength between the systems in the five-system 
is not as strong, say with a value of 0.4, the expected implementation time will be 30 time units.  
Therefore, depending on the strength of the interdependencies between the constituent systems, a 
family of systems can be a better (lower expected implementation time) alternative.  By simulating 
the development process of different alternatives via the CEM, it is possible to quantify the impact 
of system specific risk, the risk due to interdependencies, and the propagation of disruptions to 
compare different alternative solutions that can provide a desired level of capability. 
Analytical Approach 
Additional complexity in the model, carefully selected, will likely increase the efficacy of the 
CEM. However, as a simulation-based approach, it too has limitations.  Therefore, in conjunction 
with the further development of the CEM, the investigators are also developing an analytical 
approach that captures the characteristics of a network that results from the developmental 
interdependencies of systems.  This is an approach that uses a network-level metric to treat the 
same complexities via computations on conditional probabilities that relate the transmission of 
risk in networks of interdependent systems.  This provides means to compare networks in their 
ability to arrest the propagation of delays caused by random disturbances and can be used as a 
figure of merit when designing SoS architectures that aim to achieve some desired capability.   
While typical networks like the World Wide Web, social networks, and communication 
networks are a result of evolution, the networks created by the development of interdependent 
systems can be designed.  Being able to quantify the performance of such networks enables 
comparison of networks, and ultimately the design of networks that optimize that performance.  
During development, the ability of a network of systems to propagate or arrest disruptions can be 
an important performance parameter when selecting a family of systems to provide a certain level 
of capability. 
Network analysis tools can help to describe the properties of a network and to identify critical 
component systems.  The number of links and nodes in a network, for instance, can indicate the 
complexity of a network by measuring the number of systems and their link.  Similarly, network 
average degree, which describes the average number of links of each node, can indicate the level of 
connectivity in a network and help identify critical systems.   These traditional network measures, 
however, are unable to describe the performance of the entire network and, consequently, 
comparison of networks in their ability to arrest the propagation of disruptions that can create 
development delays.   
Delay propagation modeling is common in the airline industry, where delays at one airport can 
easily propagate in the aviation network and impact dependent airports.  Approaches for modeling 
and estimating these delays, however, center on regression analysis [Xu et al. (2005) and 
AhmadBeygi et al. (2008)].  AhmadBeygi et al. (2005), for instance, investigates the relationship 
between the potential propagation of flight delays to subsequent flights and the utilization levels of 
air service providers.  Even though the delays can propagate indefinitely, the delay propagation 
structure is acyclic.  A delay caused by mechanical problems to an aircraft (flight number) will 
always propagate forward.  In the system development process, delays can be cyclic, which 
increases the complexity of the problem and limits the ability of current approaches to quantify the 
total delay. 
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This research presents a network-level metric that captures the characteristics of a network that 
results from the development interdependencies of systems and it provides means to compare 
networks in their ability to arrest the propagation of delays caused by random disturbances.  
Delay Propagation 
SoS systems acquisition involves the development of many interdependent systems. 
Interdependencies impose constraints in the development of individual systems and couple their 
development.  Of concern is the propagation of delays that result from random disruptions in the 
development process of a particular system.  Disruptions in the development of one system can 
impact the development of a dependent system.  For instance, a problem in the development of one 
system can mean that systems that depend on it for information may experience delays, which can 
further delay the systems that depend on these systems.  Depending on the strength of 
interdependencies and/or the likelihood of a disruption to propagate, the network-level impact of a 
system-specific disruption can be much larger than its impact on the original system that 
experienced the disruption.  Quantifying the network-level impact of disruptions as a function of 
network characteristics can be a powerful means to compare networks.   
The approach proposed here to measure the performance of networks in their ability to arrest 
the propagation of delays is based on the classical “lost miner problem” (Ross, 2007).  In this 
example problem, a miner is lost in a cave inside a mine where there are four tunnels that lead out 







Figure 11. Lost-miner problem 
The miner can choose to enter a tunnel Ti with probability P(Ti) and has no memory of his 
previous choice. If the miner chooses tunnel T1 he wanders in the tunnel for D1 days and returns to 
the cave, where he must decide which tunnel to enter next. If he chooses tunnel T2 or T3 he 
wanders in the tunnel for D2 or D3 days, respectively, and returns to the cave. If he chooses tunnel 
TF, he is free, instantly. The question the problem poses is: What is the expected time until the 
miner reaches freedom (e.g. the expected duration of the miner’s stay in the mine)?  
We can describe the delay propagation in the system development process following the same 
reasoning.  We describe a network of systems in terms of the number of systems (caves), the 
number and direction of their dependencies (tunnels), and the characteristics of the 
interdependencies (probability of choosing a given tunnel), e.g. probability of passing-on a 
disruption and the impact of the disruption.  The simple three-system network below is used to 
describe the proposed approach. 













Figure 12. Example systems development network 
Each node represents a system that is under development (i.e. aircraft, missile, radio) to 
achieve some capability. The links indicate interdependencies between the systems as well as the 
strength of those interdependencies. For instance, system-1 depends on system-3 because 
information from system-3 is needed to continue development of system-1.  Tij represents the 
probability that a disruption in the development of system i will impact development of system j 
and Dij represents the impact of a disruption (delay) on system i that propagates to system j.  These 
two quantities represent the strength of the dependency between system i and system j.  Two 
systems can be strongly dependent if the probability of a disruption propagating from one system 
to the other is high or if the delay experienced by one system because of a disruption in the 
development of the other is large.  Node F is a sink that represent the arrest of the propagation of 
delay in the network.  In this setting, a disruption can be seen as an event that travels from system 
to system causing development delays until it exits the network (via node F).  This is similar to the 
“lost miner problem” where the miner chooses tunnels until he reaches freedom.   
In system development disruptions can be a result of funding decisions, political environment, 
technological setbacks, etc.  For example, system-1 can be faced with budget cuts and the program 
manager must reduce funding to one of the subsystems that comprise system-1. Depending on the 
magnitude of the reduction in funding, this can have no impact in the development of system-1 
with probability T1F, and nothing is affected; it can cause a delay of D11 days with probability T11 
in the development of system-1 that is not sufficiently large to impact dependent systems; or it can 
result in a delay of D13 days with probability T13 that impacts development of system-3.  
Additionally, the delay in the development of system-3 can cause further problems that delay its 
development by D33 days with probability T33; it can cause a delay of D13 days with probability T13 
that creates a problem in the development of system-3; or a delay of D31 days with probability T31 
that impacts system-1; or, conversely, the problem is not sufficiently large to cause any delays 
with probability T3F, and the propagation of delay in the network is arrested.    
Depending on the strength of the dependencies between systems and the magnitude of 
disruptions, delays can propagate and accumulate in a network.  Hence, networks with different 
number of systems, interdependencies, and strength of interdependencies will perform differently 
when faced with random disruptions.  The ability to estimate the expected accumulation of delays 
as a function of these network characteristics can enable the design of networks that minimize 
expected delay. 
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Expectation  
The expected delay until the propagation of a random event is arrested is the sum of the expected 
delays experienced by each system given the event starts in any of the component systems. 
Therefore, the expected time that the event “spends” in the network can be defined as: 
(2) 
where P(Si) is the probability of a random event occurring in system i and E(F|Si) is the expected 
time until the event is arrested given that it started in system Si.  This quantity is the sum of all the 
possible ways the event can reach system i.  We denote this as E(Fi) and define it as: 
(3)
where P(Tij) is the probability of disruption in system i that results in a disruption in system j, and 
E(Fj|Tij) is the expected time until the event is arrested (expected delay) in system j given that it 
propagated from system i.  Note that each disruption results in the accumulation of a 
predetermined amount of delay, Dij and we can write the relationship in (3) as:   
(4)
where Dij is the delay in system i caused by an event that propagates to system j.  Because Dij is a 
constant, we can rewrite this as: 
(5)
This relationship is of the form:   
(6)
where μ is the vector of the expected time until delay is arrested at each node, A is a matrix of the 
conditional probabilities P(Tij), and b is a constant term defined as:   
(7)
Here, δij has a value of 1 when i = j and 0 otherwise.  The matrix A is a transition probability 
matrix, where each system represents a state (e.g. location of the disrupting event); also it is 
Markovian, that is, the entries of A are smaller than or equal to one and the rows add up to one.  




In the context of system development Q represents the probabilities of a disruption propagating 
to dependent systems while R represents the probabilities of a disruption being arrested (e.g. 
probability of a disruption going to the final node F and exiting the network).  The identity entry 
represents the final state/node F; the probability of an event being arrested when it is in node F is 1. 
The matrix Q contains the necessary information to determine the expected time that an event 
spends in the network given that it is in a given system.  The solution to the problem in (6) when 
solving for μ is: 
 μ = (I – Q)-1b (9)
Because the matrix Q is part of the transition probability matrix A and R is a non-zero vector, in 
general at least one of the rows of Q sums to a number strictly less than 1 (for the example problem 
presented here all rows of Q are strictly less than 1). This means that there is one eigenvalue of A 
that lies on the unit disc and the others are inside the unit disc. This characteristic of A and Q 
ensure that (I – Q) is always invertible and the eigenvalues of Q are always positive. 
The solution to Eq (9) indicates the expected time until a disrupting event is arrested given that it is 
in any of the systems.  Therefore, the total expected delay in (2) is: 
 
(10)
For the three-system network in Figure 12Error! Reference source not found., the expected 
time until a delay is arrested is 3.57 time units, assuming that an event is equally like to hit any of 
the three systems, the transition probabilities, T1ij, for the example problem are: 
(11)
and the impacts of disruptions, Dij are of one (1) time unit (e.g. one week, one month, etc.).   
 
(12)
Additionally, the expected delay if a random event impacts system-1 (μ1) is 3.43 time units; if 
it impacts system-2 (μ2) it is 4.0 time units; and if it impacts system-3  (μ3) it is 3.29 time units.   
The expected delay is a metric that describes the entire network and its ability to propagate or 
arrest delays as well as the criticality of individual systems to propagate delays.  In this example, 
system-2 is the most critical system because a disruption in its development results in the highest 
expected delay.  This reflects the fact that system-2 has the lowest probability of arresting a delay 
(R(2)=1/5). Conversely, system-3 is less critical than system-1, (a disruption in its development 
results in smaller expected delay) because, while both systems have the same probability of 
arresting a delay, there are two systems that depend on system-1 (system-2 and system-3) while 
there is only one system that depends on system-3 (system-1).  Additionally, because disruptions 
to system-1 can propagate to system-2 (the system with the lowest probability of arresting a 
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disruption) this contributes to disruptions to system-1 resulting in larger expected delays than 
disruptions to system-3.  
Typical measures of network topologies like eigenvector centrality are able to identify this 
criticality of nodes.  Eigenvector centrality is an extension of degree centrality of a node – the 
number of links connected to a node – that acknowledges that not all links connected to a node are 
equal (Newman, 2008).  In this setting, the importance of links is conveyed by the probability of 
propagation and the impact of the disruption.  While a useful measure, this does not describe the 
entire network and it cannot be used as a metric to compare different network structures/topologies.  
The expected delay measure presented here contains information about the network structure 
(number of nodes and links) as well as the characteristics of the interdependencies.  This provides 
a means to describe the entire network and its performance – in this case, delay propagation.     
Network Metric  
In order to ensure that the expectation metric contains all the necessary information to compare 
different networks when their transition probabilities or the impacts of disruptions change, a 
metric is also needed to serve as a second descriptor of the networks.  This must take into 
consideration the number of nodes and links in a network, the transition probabilities, the impact 
of disruptions, and the probability of an event occurring in any given system.  Here we define the 
network metric, M, as follows: 
(13)
Higher interdependency strengths (e.g. larger values for the Qij and/or bi entries) mean higher 
values of M.  The quantity M becomes in this way a means to capture the characteristics of a 
network and makes possible the comparison of the expected delay when network characteristics 
change.  Higher interdependency strengths (e.g. larger values for the Qij and/or bi entries) mean 
higher values of M. 
Network Comparison  
Development of different families of systems can result in the achievement of the same 
capability-level.  Not all families of systems, however, have the same risk characteristics.  Each 
candidate family of systems can be comprised of different systems, different system 
interdependencies, and different interdependency strengths.  An SoS manager may want to decide 
which solution provides the highest likelihood of success or the smallest expected delays when 
disruptions impact the development process.  We demonstrate the applicability of the metric 
proposed here to compare networks of systems via an example.  Figure 13 presents an alternative 
family of systems to the systems presented in Figure 12.   




















Figure 13. Alternate systems development network 
This alternative solution has five systems, which may be different than the three systems of the 
original alternative, but that provide the same capability.  The SoS manager would like to know 
how the two networks that result from the interdependencies of the different component systems 
compare when faced with unexpected disruptions.   
Assuming that the impacts of disruptions, Dij, are of one (1) time unit and that the probability of a 




the expected total delay is 2.17 time units.  Recall that for the three-system network the expected 
total delay was of 3.57 time units.  The five-system network, therefore, is capable of arresting 
disruptions more effectively than the three-system network, even if it has more systems and 
interdependencies (seven interdependencies versus four in the three-system network).  
Because the impact of a disturbance is of one time unit in both networks, the difference in the 
expected total delay is due to the number of systems in each network, the number of 
interdependencies, and their strengths (e.g. the probability of propagation).  One way to see this is 
that the probabilities of an event causing no delay (e.g. probability of going from a system i to the 
sink-node F) are larger for the  five-system network (1/4, 1/3, 1/3, 1/3, and 1/3 for system 1, 2, 3, 4, 
and 5, respectively) than the three-system network (1/5, 1/4, 1/5 for system 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively).  This means that a disturbance has a higher probability of causing no delay, or of 
being arrested, in the five-system network than the three-system network.  While these values are 
assumptions in this demonstrative example, in actual development networks they can be a result of 
different system structures, organization, and/or risk profiles.  
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Impact of disruptions 
Here we assume that the transition matrices T1ij and T
2
ij are constant and have the values 
presented in (11) and (14), respectively, and that the impact of disturbances, Dij, is random 
(uniformly random between 1 and 10 time units). Differentiating the networks by varying the 
impact of disruptions helps to demonstrate the ability of the expectation-metric to compare 
network performance.  Figure 14 presents a comparison of the expected total delay in these 
networks.   
Because the impact of disruptions has the same bounds for both networks (uniformly random 
between 1 and 10 time units), the five-system network always performs better than the 
three-system network. This points out the importance of interdependencies and their 
characteristics to the ability of a network to arrest delays. 

































Figure 14. Expected total delay for random impact of disruptions 
  
Impact of network characteristics  
To demonstrate the ability of the expectation-metric to capture system, interdependency, and 
network characteristics we also consider the comparison of networks when the number of nodes, 
links, and the strength of dependencies (probability of propagation and impact of disruption) 
varies.  Figure 15 presents these trends for random transition probability matrices Tij (ensuring the 
rows sum to one) as well as random disruption impact matrices Dij (uniformly random values 
between 1 and 10).   
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Figure 15. Expected total delay for random transitional probabilities, Tij and random Dij 
These trends show that as the network metric M increases, the expected delay in the 
network also increases and the metric M is able to capture the pertinent network characteristics.  
Hence, for a given value of M networks can have different number of nodes, links, and different 
interdependency strengths.  Development of interdependent systems has the potential to provide 
capabilities that go beyond the capabilities of individual systems.  The resulting networks, 
however, introduce new complexities and risk in the development process.  Disruptions in the 
development of one system can propagate and impact the development of other systems.  To 
determine the optimal family of systems that can achieve a desired capability while minimizing the 
negative impacts of interdependencies requires the quantification of the impact of disruptions and 
the ability of a network to arrest their propagation within the network. 
Overall, the approach can be used to quantify the ability of a network to arrest the 
propagation of delays that result from such disruptions.  Such network-level metric can aid SoS 
engineers in determining the family of systems that can provide a desired capability while 
quantifying and, eventually, minimizing the impact of random disruptions throughout the 
development process.  Furthermore, when coupled with simulation-based tools such as the CEM, 
it can provide a theoretical basis for measuring the performance of the simulation. 
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